DBSTENO, PETTY, WEGENER, AND RUCKER see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) , and sobering because important decisions such as which political policies to support or whether to seek health treatment appear to depend, to some degree, on an affective state that could have arisen from circumstances completely irrelevant to the question at hand. For instance, hearing an uplifting story on the radio might increase an individual's positive mood, which, in turn, might decrease his perceptions of vulnerability to lung cancer and, thereby, undermine motivation to resist lighting that next cigarette (cf. Johnson & Tversky, 1983) .
To date, the nature of the affect-driven bias of likelihood perceptions has been thought to be quite general (Mayer et al., 1992) . Much research has shown that positive and negative moods bias judgments for all types of valenced events (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer et al., 1992) . In the present article, however, we sought to examine further the influence of emotion on likelihood judgment through posing three new questions stemming from a different theoretical perspective than that of affective valence: emotion specificity. First, given the existence of many distinct emotions of the same valence, might it be that likelihood judgements are Sensitive to discrete emotional states as opposed to solely the valence of the states? That is, might it be that different discrete emotions of the same valence differentially increase estimates for events matching these states in emotional overtone? Second, if such an emotion-specific bias does exist, through what mechanism does it operate? And third, if an emotion-specific bias is found, must it be the inevitable result of likelihood estimation in the presence of heightened emotional states? Answers to these questions are paramount, for they have the potential to increase substantially our understanding of the ways in which the emotional system affects likelihood estimation and, thereby, many related psychological processes (e.g., persuasion, health behavior). Johnson and Tversky's (1983) seminal work in the area of affect and risk perception was designed to examine the ways in which moods stemming from knowledge about specific negative events bias individuals' estimates of other types of risks. In their studies, individuals first read one of several articles designed to induce a negative mood (e.g., a story about a natural disaster). Following this task, the participants estimated the likelihoods of a series of negative events (e.g., natural disasters, violent acts, disease incidence). For each participant, some of the negative events were representative of the same category as the event described in the mood-induction article, and some of the events were not. The findings revealed a quite consistent and general pattern: The experience of negative mood equally inflated individuals' estimates for all types of negative events, irrespective of their semantic associations to the events described in the induction articles. For example, reading an article about a disease (e.g., leukemia) did not increase likelihood estimates for fatalities due to other diseases (e.g., cancer) more so than it did for estimates of fatalities due to natural disasters (e.g., tornadoes). Similar effects have also been found for positive mood; positively valenced events have been shown to appear more probable to happy than to neutral or unhappy individuals (e.g., Mayer et al., 1992; Wegener, Petty, & Klein, 1994) .
THE CASE FOR SPECIFICITY
These findings have lead to the belief that the effects of mood on risk perception are quite global (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Mayer et al., 1992) . According to the prevailing view, likelihood estimates ~hould be inflated for all events possessing emotional overtones that match an individual's affective state in valence. That is, sadness, for example, would be expected to increase equally estimates of depressing, angering, and frightening events. This global bias appears sensible given the vast body of research documenting the effects of positive and negative mood on all manner of cognitive processes ranging from subliminal conditioning (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) and similarity assessment (e.g., to attitude change (e.g., Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993) and strategic negotiation (e.g., Forgas, 1998) . Considered in combination with models of emotion that identify valence as one of the primary distinguishing dimensions of emotional states (e.g., Russell, 1983 Russell, , 1989 , such research suggests that the valence of an emotional experience might be both its most central characteristic and the foremost determinant of its effects on cognition (Clore et al., 1994; Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 1990) .
Recently, however, interest in the form and function of discrete emotional experiences has been rekindled. In opposition to the dimensional view of emotion, many theorists view discrete emotions not as related experiences characterized by differing levels of a few fundamental constructs (e.g., valence, arousal) but as separate entities comprising distinct cognitive (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and physiological (e.g., LeDoux, 1992; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990; Panksepp, 1994) components. Adoption of this perspective necessarily obliges one to entertain the notion that specific emotions might have specific effects on cognition that are not reducible to a function of their valence. Given that emotions, like simpler affectire states, act to guide behavior in response to specific stimuli (Averill, 1994; Darwin, 1872; Frijda, 1986; Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, in press; Tomkins, 1962) , there is every reason to think that they should influence certain types of cognitive processes in different ways as well (cf. Kelmer, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Niedenthal & Halberstadt, 1995; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) . Anger and sadness, for example, might affect cognition differently even though they are both negative states.
Recent research has begun to provide evidence supportive of this view. For example, discrete emotions of the same valence have been found to increase the accessibility of semantic information that matches these states in emotional overtone (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994) . Distinct negative emotions have also been shown to induce different styles of information processing involving judgments of stereotype applicability (Bodenhausen, 1993) . More relevant to the present topic, specific emotions have been shown to influence the attributions of causality assigned to ambiguously caused events (Keltner et al., 1993) . Guided by appraisal theories of emotion, Keltner et al. argued that angry individuals should perceive ambiguously caused events (e.g., one's house catching fire) as more likely resulting from human agency (e.g., an arsonist) than from situational agency (e.g., a brush fire), but sad individuals should perceive the opposite. This bias was theorized to result from the cueing and use of the distinct, agency-related appraisals that accompany the experiences of sadness and anger (cf. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988) . In a series of experiments, Keltner et al. found partial support for their predictions. Although the attributional bias affected judgments for negative events, the expected influence on perceptions of positive events did not occur. Nonetheless, this research is quite important, for it not only identified a unique attributional bias but also provided evidence that specific emotions of the same valence can have very different effects on judgment.
In the present studies, we sought to further explore the cognitive significance of discrete emotions. The bias of interest in these studies, however, did not concern the agentic causes of specific events but rather concerned the perceived likelihoods of the events actually occurring.
Method Participants
One hundred and thirty-three undergraduate psychology students at Ohio State University participated in this experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two emotion induction conditions: sadness (n = 71) or anger (n = 62).
Procedure

THE PRESENT STUDIES
In contrast to the recent findings detailing the effects of specific emotions on memory and social judgment, evidence for an emotion-specific bias influencing likelihood estimation remains elusive. Although Johnson and Tversky (1983) noted that the bias they identified was quite global and extended to likelihood judgments for all types of congruently valenced events, little could be gleaned from their findings regarding the generalization of this bias to specific emotions. Both the natures of the mood inductions and the overtones of the judged events used in their studies were not designed to compare specific emotional states. Other researchers, though using more narrowly categorized events (e.g., angering, fearful) have also concluded that mood-based biases on likelihood estimation are due to general valence differences, regardless of the specific emotions experienced (e.g., Mayer et al., 1992) . These conclusions, however, stem from studies of naturally occurring affect in which it was unlikely that large numbers of participants were experiencing pure, specific states. Therefore, to investigate the possibility that specific emotions may bias likelihood judgments in a more circumscribed way than that resulting from simple positive and negative mood states, we systematically manipulated participants' discrete emotional states. In a series of studies, we evoked experiences of sadness and anger in participants and proceeded to examine the effects of these states on their likelihood estimates of sad and angering events, the possible mediating mechanisms underlying any biases, and the inevitability of any biases on judgment.
Study 1
In order to determine if estimates of event likelihoods are subject to an emotion-specific congruency bias, we used a paradigm quite similar to the one used by Johnson and Tversky (1983) . As in their studies, we induced mild emotional states in participants by having them read passages that they were led to believe formed part of an experiment unrelated to the likelihood estimation task. However, unlike the original studies, we induced two discrete emotions, sadness and anger, that were both negatively valenced. Following the emotion inductions, participants estimated the frequencies of a series of sad and angering events. If the predicted congruency bias exists, participants should perceive events possessing overtones congruent with their emotional states to be more likely to occur. That is, anger should inflate estimates for the occurrence of angering, as compared with sad, events, but sadness should result in the opposite. Failure to find such moderation of likelihood judgments by these emotional states would support the view that the likelihood estimation bias is not emotion specific but rather only affects judgment as a function of the match between the valences of emotional states and events.
Upon arrival, participants were assigned to either the sad or angry emotion condition and seated in a cubicle equipped with a personal computer. The experimenter informed them that they were to participate in two studies. They were told that the first study was designed to assess their perceptions of and memories for an article taken from a national magazine. These articles, in fact, served as emotion manipulations and contained either sad or angering information. Participants were also told that the second study was designed to assess general knowledge regarding the frequencies of common events. This portion of the study allowed us to obtain likelihood estimates for a series of sad and angering events. The experirnenter relayed to participants that they would first read paper copies of an article, then return it to the experimenter, and then complete the materials for both studies by responding to questions presented on the computer. He then stated that the general knowledge questions would be asked first, followed by questions concerning the articles. He explained that this ordering was necessary to allow some time to elapse between finishing the article and answering questions concerning memory for the events it described. Participants were also instructed to picture the events described in the articles as vividly as possible.
The computer-based presentation of materials and collection of data were accomplished using MediaLab (Jarvis, 1998) . Immediately after reading the emotion manipulation articles, participants turned toward the computers in their cubicles and were presented with the instructions for the likelihood estimation task, followed by the task itself. Order of event presentation was randomized for each participant. Upon completion of the likelihood judgments, participants were presented with the emotion manipulation check. Order of questions was again randomized. We had participants respond to the emotion check after the estimation task in order to reduce their awareness of the emotional states induced by the articles. Because the estimation task was usually completed in less than 5 min, we expected that the emotion check would be able to provide a reasonably accurate assessment of manipulated emotion even in this temporally removed position. Finally, participants completed a series of demographic questions (e.g., gender, age) and other measures not relevant to the present study and were then instructed on screen to report to the experimenter in a separate room where they were debriefed.
Manipulations and Measures
Emotion manipulation. To induce mild states of sadness or anger in participants, we asked them to read one of two articles that they believed had been excerpted from an unidentified national magazine. The sadness manipulation was adapted from and detailed the effects of a natural disaster on a small village in Africa. The anger manipulation was created for the present study and described multiple anti-American protests in Iraq. Although Johnson and Tversky (1983) found no biasing effects resulting from the semantic relations between the target events and mood induction materials, we ensured that the events described in the present manipulations did not substantively overlap with those constituting the likelihood estimation measure. Consequently, no events concerning natural disasters or anti-American activities served as stimuli for frequency estimates.
Event type manipulation and likelihood estimation. We presented participants with eight questions of the form, "Of people, how many will experience ?" For example, one question was the following: "Of the 2,000,000 people in the U.S. this year who will buy a used car, how many will intentionally be sold a 'lemon' by a dishonest car dealer?" Participants responded to each question by providing their best estimates. Four of these questions concerned events that had been determined through pretesting to evoke sadness in anyone experiencing them (e.g., a best friend moving away). The remaining four concerned events that had been determined to evoke anger (e.g., intentionally being sold a "lemon" by a used car dealer; see Appendix A for full stimulus set)) The likelihood estimation task was similar to the one used by Johnson and Tversky (1983) except that we placed caps on the upper limits of the responses. That is, we asked participants to provide an estimate of the X number of people out of Y who would experience the event, rather than simply asking them to provide an estimate without a limiting cap. We instituted this modification of the original procedure so as to diminish the large positive skews described as occurring in that data.
To arrive at reliable estimates of participants' general perceptions of the relative likelihood of events, we calculated composite likelihood measures by combining their responses to the eight events into two variables: sad events and angering events. However, as each of these estimates was made with reference to a different metric (e.g., X out of 20,000; X out of 4,000,000) and represented distinct events with different mean frequencies and probabilities of occurrence, a simple averaging of an individual's raw estimates would have been meaningless. We therefore z-transformed responses to each of the eight events across participants. In this way, relative differences for each distribution could be combined to produce a general index of bias. A positive z score for any given event indicated that the participant believed it to be more likely than the mean level of perceived occurrence for that event. Similarly, a negative z score indicated a lower than average perception of likelihood. We then calculated the composite measures for each participant by computing the means of his or her transformed estimates for the different event categories, respectively. It is important to note, however, that before calculating these composite indexes, we eliminated any raw responses corresponding to transformed scores with absolute values greater than 4 and then retransformed the raw scores to compute the composite measures without these outliers. 2
Emotion manipulation check. To assess the effectiveness of the emotion manipulations, we asked participants to indicate how sad, gloomy, down, angry, annoyed, frustrated, and irritated they felt, using a 4-point scale for each item that was anchored by definitely do not feel and definitely feel. To index sadness, we calculated the mean of the first three items (Cronbach c~ = .80); to index anger, we calculated the mean of the final four items (Cronbach a = .88). 3
Results and Discussion
Emotion Manipulation Checks
The emotion manipulations were successful in producing two groups of participants who experienced the expected emotional 
Emotion Specificity in Perceptions of Likelihood
Our primary prediction was that an emotion-specific congruency bias would emerge such that a match between the emotion a participant was experiencing (e.g., anger) and the emotional overtone of a judged event (e.g., anger-inducing event) would result in an increased estimate for that event's occurrence. A 2 (emotional state) x 2 (event type) mixed ANOVA treating Event Type as a repeated factor confirmed the predicted Emotional State × Event Type interaction, F(1,131) = 8.19,p < .01, d = 0.50. As depicted in Figure 1 , sad individuals believed sad events to be more likely to occur than angering ones, t(70) = 1.77, p < .08, but angry individuals believed angering events to be more likely than sad ones, t(61) = 2.37, p < .05. No other effects approached significance. 4
1 We selected these eight items from a larger list of events that had been rated for the levels of anger and sadness they would cause if experienced. The present items were chosen so as to be highly indicative of one of these emotions but not of the other. Pretesting on separate samples confirmed that emotional overtone had been manipulated in the expected manner. A similar procedure was followed for the selection of events in each of the studies reported. Though not a central focus of the current article, we wanted to avoid using event targets that conflated agentic cause (i.e., human or situational agency) with event type (sad or angering). Therefore, we constructed the target events so that an equal number of each type (i.e., events pretested as evoking sadness vs. anger) were the result of human agency and fate using the definitions provided by Keltner et al. (1993; see Appendix A) .
2 As these data were transformed to z scores, an absolute value of 4 corresponds to a distance of 4 standard deviations from the mean. Given that scores in this area of the distribution constitute only a very small proportion of the overall data (1.5%), it seems quite reasonable to consider them as probable errors in data entry (e.g., adding an extra zero to a value when typing the response). Outlier analyses using the Tukey box plot procedure corroborated this sentiment. All removed items qualified as far-outs in these analyses (Tukey, 1977) . Their removal, however, was necessary. Though small in number, errors in orders of magnitude would have substantially biased mean estimates of the perceived likelihoods of events.
3 This measure is adapted from the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) .
4 Whether the events were due to human agency or fate (see Footnote 1) did not influence the results of this analysis (all Fs < 1). Therefore, it appears that the congruency bias reported here is not synonymous with the appraisal-based attribution mechanism studied by Keltner et al. (1993) . The results of Study 1 do raise an interesting possibility regarding the data from Keltner et al. (1993) , however. As noted earlier, Keltner et al. expected to find effects of sp~ific negative emotions on attributions for both positive and negative events but found such effects only for negative events. One possibility not previously considered would be that the current emotionspecific congruency bias partially underlies the Keltner et al, findings. For example, angry individuals in the Keltner et al. (1993) studies might have believed that ambiguously caused events were more likely to result from human agency than from fate because of a perception that angering events were more likely than sad ones. That is, an angry individual might believe that it is more likely that his or her house would burn because of arson than because of a brush fire simply because arson, but not a brush fire, possesses angering overtones. Moreover, because positive events resulting from either human agency or fate are not angering, judgments of these two types of events would not be influenced by the congruency bias and would, consequently, not result in different likelihood estimates for these events. 
Emotional State
Relative likelihood estimates for sad and angering events as a function of emotional state in Study 1.
Given these findings, it seems clear that the influence of emotion on the perceptions of event likelihoods is not limited to valence. As predicted, individuals' discrete emotions moderated their perceptions of the likelihoods of events. Specifically, estimates for events possessing overtones congruent with individuals' discrete emotional states were inflated. Confirmation of this congruency bias highlights the importance of specificity in emotional influences on cognition. Moderation of likelihood estimates by emotions of the same valence is possible and, consequently, implies that more precision in charting emotion-related biases on judgment and risk perception can be obtained through an emotionspecific approach than through one based on valence alone.
Study 2
Having demonstrated that emotions of the same valence can differentially bias likelihood judgments, we next sought to examine the mechanisms that underlie this effect. Based on past emotion research, two possible mediators appeared likely: (a) a mechanism based on the differential accessibility, or ease-of-retrieval, of episodic memories depicting the judged events (cf. Schwarz et al., 1991) and (b) a mechanism involving the use of emotional states as informative cues regarding the status of one's environment (cf. Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) . In the present study, we investigated the tenability of the first mechanism, and in the next study we explored the second.
Given research suggesting that specific emotions can act as an organizational framework in memory and consequently facilitate recall of emotion-specific semantic information (Niedenthal & Halberstadt, 1995; Niedenthal et al., 1997; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994) , it might be the case that likelihood estimates are biased in an emotion-specific manner due to increases in the accessibility of emotionally congruent episodic memories. Indeed, past research has shown that the heightened accessibility of certain exemplars in memory can increase estimates of their frequencies of occurrence (Schwarz et al., 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) .
The experience of anger, therefore, might increase the ease with which events involving violence are recalled and, thereby, positively bias one's estimates for the frequencies of such events.
To examine this possibility, we made one modification to the protocol of Study 1: the addition of an episodic memory recall task. For this measure, individuals were told that descriptions of commonly occurring events would appear on a computer screen. Their task was to attempt to recall as quickly as possible a time that they remembered this type of event happening to them or to anyone else and to depress a computer key when they had done so. The set of recall stimuli consisted of angerinducing (e.g., being lied to, receiving an unfair grade) and neutral (e.g., going to the library, purchasing a CD) events. ~ If it is the case that likelihood judgements are biased because discrete emotions facilitate recall of episodic memories sharing their emotional overtones, then angry participants should evidence accelerated (i.e., easier) recall for anger-relevant memories in comparison with sad participants.
5 We chose neutral and angering, as opposed to sad and angering, events so as to reduce the possibility of conflation of the emotional states. In a pilot experiment using recall of sad and angering events, participants' emotional states on a manipulation check did not clearly reflect their emotion group assignment. This situation may have resulted from having the two groups recall both sad and angering events, which served to move their emotional states toward one another. Therefore, in the current experiment, only angering events were used. As expected, analysis of the emotion manipulation checks revealed the existence of the appropriate emotional states among members of the two emotion groups. With regard to the effects of recall in the pilot experiment (which used sad and angering events), it is instructive to note that even when data from a subsample of the participants were examined (i.e., people for whom the emotion inductions appeared to be successful), no evidence for differential recall of sad and angering events emerged as a function of emotional states. The congruency bias on likelihood judgments, however, was present.
Method Participants
One hundred and eleven undergraduate psychology students at Ohio State University participated in this experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two emotion induction conditions: sadness (n = 53) or anger (n = 58).
Procedure
initial practice event, presentation order of the remaining 10 neutral and 10 angering events was randomized for each participant. We used mean latencies for each type of event recalled as accessibility indexes in the following data analyses.
Event type manipulation and likelihood estimation. Event type manipulation and likelihood estimation followed the same procedure as in Study 1, with the exception that the stimuli consisted of three sad, three angering, and three filler judgments (see Appendix A for complete stimulus set). Data transformations and outlier removal were also conducted in the same manner as in Study 1.
Upon arrival, participants were assigned to either the sad or angry emotion condition and seated in a cubicle equipped with a personal computer. The experimenter informed them that they were about to participate in a study designed to examine memory for past events. Therefore, they would be asked to complete many trials in which specific events would appear on the computer screen for them to recall as quickly as possible. The experimenter also informed them that because such trials can be tedious, the experiment would be conducted in blocks with periodic breaks. During these breaks, they would be asked to complete materials for other studies that were being pretested. Specifically, they would be asked to read articles that would be used for other memory tests (i.e,, the emotion inductions) and complete questionnaires that gauged their knowledge about specific events in the world (i.e., the likelihood estimation task).
The computer-based presentation of all materials and collection of data were again accomplished using MediaLab (Jarvis, 1998) . Participants first completed a series of trials for the recall task (details of the procedure are described below). They were led to believe that these trials were part of the experiment, but in actuality the trials served as practice to allow participants to become familiar with the task. Participants next read the appropriate emotion-induction article. After completing the article, they were instructed on screen that it was time to complete the second block of the recall task. Here, participants provided latencies for the recall of neutral and angering events. Immediately following the recall task, participants completed the likelihood estimation measure and emotion manipulation check exactly as in Study 1. They were then debriefed.
Manipulations and Measures
Emotion manipulation. Manipulations were identical to those used in Study 1.
Emotion manipulation check.
We assessed emotional states in the same manner as in Study 1.
Event recall task.
Using a procedure adapted from MacLeod and Campbell (1992), we constructed a set of stimuli consisting of 21 event descriptions in the form of verb phrases (e.g., went to a movie, experienced discrimination;
see Appendix B for complete set of stimuli). Ten events described angering occurrences, 10 events described neutral occurrences, and 1 additional neutral event served as the initial trial designed to allow participants to become reacquainted with the task. At the beginning of the experimental session, participants had completed a set of 10 similar trials using neulral events. This task served as a practice run for the event recall measure. Participants were told to recall from memory as quickly as possible any instance of the event appearing on screen occurring either to them or to someone else. Although all events represented relatively common occurrences, it was possible that not all participants would have instances of every exemplar in memory. Therefore, participants were told that after a certain time period had passed, the computer would automatically proceed to the next trial.
Trials were preceded by a set of four asterisks that served both as a delimiter between trials and as a focusing cue. The intertrial intervals were 2 s in duration. Each trial consisted of the presentation of an event description for a maximum duration of 6 s. Upon recalling an instance of the event, participants were instructed to depress a specific computer key using the forefinger of their dominant hand. Immediately following the participant's response, or after 6 s without a response, the 2-s delimiter screen appeared and was subsequently followed by the next trial. After the
Results and Discussion
Emotion Manipulation Checks
The emotion manipulations were again successful in producing two groups of participants who experienced distinctly different negative emotional states. A 2 (manipulated emotion group) x 2 (measured emotion) mixed ANOVA treating Measured Emotion as a repeated factor revealed the predicted interaction, F ( 
Effects of Emotional State on Event Recall and Likelihood Judgment
A critical step in determining the plausibility of an ease-of-recall, or accessibility-based, mediator for the congruency bias was to examine whether or not sadness and anger differentially facilitated the recall of angering, as opposed to neutral, events. A 2 (emotion group) × 2 (event type) mixed ANOVA treating Type of Event as a repeated factor revealed no hint of support for such a mechanism, F(1, 109) = 0.53, p = .47. 6 The different negative emotions did not differentially influence the retrieval of angering, as compared with neutral, episodic memories. The only difference on recall to emerge was a large and expected main effect of event type, F(1, 109) = 240.72,p < .001. Both sad (M = 1,384 ms, SD = 524 ms) and angry (M = 1,459 ms, SD = 505 ms) participants recalled neutral events more quickly than angering events (M = 2,275 ms, SD = 927 ms; M = 2,270 ms, SD = 846 ms, respectively). Such a difference makes good sense in that the daily lives of most individuals tend to entail many more neutral events (e.g., going to the library) than angering ones (e.g., being insulted by someone).
Failure to find evidence of differential recall facilitation for anger-toned episodic memories among sad and angry individuals casts doubt on the view that an accessibility-based mechanism underlies the likelihood congruency bias. A 2 (emotional 6 Analyses conducted using log-transformed values of response times led to the same conclusions. It should also be noted that a secondary analysis in which missing data points were replaced with a value of 6,000 ms (i.e., the capped value for latency) was quite similar in that no support emerged for an interaction involving emotional state and event overtone. state) X 2 (event type) mixed ANOVA treating Event Type as a repeated factor again documented the existence of the congruency bias, Finteraction(1 , 109) = 2.89, p = .09, d = 0.23. Given that discrete emotional states were again found to elevate likelihood estimates for events matching these states in emotional overtone (see Figure 2 ) and that these emotions failed to influence the accessibility of relevant memories, it seems unlikely that the likelihood bias stems from a memory-based process. However, given past work demonstrating emotion-induced accessibility effects involving semantic information , further examination of the role of recalled exemplars is warranted.
Study 3
In Study 3, we again examined the tenability of a recall-based mediator in addition to investigating the viability of a second possible mediating mechanism: the use of emotion as an informative cue (cf. Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) . The experience of emotion has been theorized to inform an organism about important aspects of its environment and to motivate it to take appropriate action (Frijda, 1986; Salovey et al., in press; Tomkins, 1962) . For example, the experience of fear signals danger in the environment, the experience of sadness signals the occurrence of a loss and the need for succorance, and the experience of anger signals the occurrence of frustration or aggressive confrontation (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Tomkins, 1962) . Such emotions usually arise in response to specific environmental contingencies for which they represent an appropriate appraisal and response (Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984) . Consequently, they may be incorporated into various judgment processes as appropriate and accurate sources of information (Clore & Parrott, 1991) . However, if the judgment domain shifts to one that is irrelevant to the source of the extant emotion, the utility of the emotional experience as a veridical source of information can be called into question (Clore et al., 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) .
Schwarz and his colleagues have repeatedly argued that individuals use their affective states as sources of information regarding the global status of their environments (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) . That is, the experience of positive affect is said to correspond to an assessment that the environment is safe, and negative affect to an assessment that the environment is problematic. Because of this. ptmitive and negative moods have been thought to motivate differerlt types of cognitive and behaviorai responses (for a review of supporting research, see Schwarz & Clore, 1996) .
In a similar vein, we believe that it is quite possible that experiences of discrete emotions serve as more narrowly focused informative cues regarding one's environment and that when asked to estimate the likelihoods of events, individuals might use their current emotional states as a source of information. Much as fear can inform one to be wary, anger might inform one that violence is likely (cf. Schwarz, Servay, & Kumpf, 1985) . Given that moods and emotions are most likely to serve such an informational function when the judgments at hand are cumbersome, complex, and require information not readily available (Schwarz & Clore, 1996) , it seems quite probable that such a mechanism might underlie the congruency bias reported here. The likelihood estimation tasks we used easily satisfy these conditions for most individuals.
If such a process mediates the likelihood bias, then discrete emotional states should produce a sense that events in the world at large reflect, or resonate with, the current emotion. For example, the experience of sadness should give rise to a general belief that the world is a depressing place. Similarly, the experience of anger should engender a belief that the world is a frustrating or hostile place. Under conditions in which individuals confront judgments requiring unavailable information or processing effort, they might use a more heuristic strategy that entails the use of their emotions as sources of viable information in order to arrive at a response (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; cf. Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) . For instance, when confronted with estimating the number of people who are victims of discrimination in a given year (a daunting task for most individuals without the use of public records), individuals may unwittingly use the information supplied to them by their emotional states. Those who are angry may be confronted with a global sense that the world is
• >---0.02 violent and frustrating, but those who are sad may be confronted with a global sense that the world is gloomy and depressing. Consequently, those who are angry should produce inflated estimates of the likelihoods of angering events because they are using an emotional cue indicative of a belief that the world is an angering place. Sad individuals should show a similarly mediated effect for sad events.
In order to determine if such a process mediates the congruency bias, we again conducted an experiment quite similar to that of Study 1. However, we included a measure designed to assess the endorsement of specific types of global beliefs about the environment. We also included a different type of event accessibility measure than had been used in Study 2 in order to reexamine the viability of event recall as a mediating mechanism. The present measure relied on the number of events of each type recalled as opposed to the response latencies for the recall of such events; amount of information, as opposed to its ease of retrieval, might be responsible for the bias. Therefore, we sought to determine in the current study: (a) if discrete emotions give rise to distinct beliefs about the world at large, which are subsequently used in the generation of likelihood estimates, and (b) if discrete emotions increase the number of recalled episodic memories matching these states in emotional overtone, which might also be used in estimate generation.
general environments. The measure consisted of 6 statements. Each statement was of the form "The world is an X place," with X representing surprising, sad, angering, happy, depressing, and irritating. Participants responded with agreement to each question using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Surprising was always the first statement, followed by sad and angering presented randomly, followed by happy, followed by depressing and irritating presented randomly. We calculated global beliefs that the world is sad and angering as the mean of the sad and depressing, and angering and irritating items, respectively.
Event type manipulation and likelihood estimation. Event type manipulation and likelihood estimation followed the same procedure as in Study 2 (see Appendix A for complete stimulus set).
Recall of sad and angering events. Participants were asked to recall events that had evoked sadness and anger. Specifically, each participant was asked to enter phrases that described specific events of the appropriate type (examples were "death of my grandmother," "getting ripped off," etc.). As each event was entered on the computer, the screen was cleared in preparation for the next event. When no further exemplars could be recalled, participants hit the escape key and began recall of the second type of event. Order of the sad and angering recall measures was randomized across participants.
Results and Discussion
Emotion Manipulation Checks
Method Participants
Sixty-five undergraduate psychology students at Ohio State University participated in this experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two emotion induction conditions: sadness (n = 33) or anger (n = 32).
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were assigned to either the angry or sad emotion condition and were seated in a cubicle equipped with a personal computer. The experimenter informed them that they were about to participate in two experiments. The ftrst was designed to examine their memories for information they read or hear in the media. The second was designed to assess their opinions about and knowledge of events in the world, In the first study, therefore, they would read an article excerpted from a national magazine (i.e., the emotion-induction articles). Because it would be necessary for some time to pass before assessing their memories for the article, the second experiment would be completed immediately after they had finished reading the articles.
The computer-based presentation of all materials and collection of data were again accomplished using MediaLab (Jarvis, 1998) . Participants first read the emotion manipulation articles. They then completed the differential beliefs and likelihood estimation tasks (described below). These tasks were followed by the event recall measure and completion of the emotion manipulation check in addition to questionnaires measuring demographic information and other indexes not relevant to the current study.
Manipulations and Measures
Emotion manipulation. Manipulations were identical to those described in Study 1.
Emotion manipulation check.
We assessed emotional states in the same manner as in Study 1. 
Differential beliefs task.
Initial Examination of Possible Mediators
A critical step in assessing the viability of the two proposed mediators was to examine the relation of emotional state to each. We, therefore, examined whether anger and sadness (a) resulted in differential recall of sad and angering events, (b) resulted in distinct biases on general beliefs about the state of the world, or (c) both of these. With regard to the recall measure, it is important to note that it was administered following likelihood judgments in the present protocol. Consequently, individuals were exposed to specific event descriptions that may have primed related episodic memories. However, the amount of sad and angering events presented as judgment stimuli was equivalent and therefore unlikely to have resulted in a systematic bias in the number of episodic memories retrieved.
A 2 (emotional state) x 2 (type of recalled event) mixed ANOVA treating Type of Event as a repeated factor provided no evidence for a differential effect of emotional state on recall for the two types of events; however, a main effect for type of event emerged such that more sad-toned (M = 4.45, SD = 3.23) than anger-toned (M = 3.35, SD = 2.90) events were recalled by members of both groups, F(1, 63) = 6.98, p = .01. Taken in combination with the findings of Study 2, this result provides further support for the view that event recall is not a viable mediator for the congruency bias. In addition, it argues against an assertion that any emotion-induced differences in beliefs about the environment rest on a mental computation involving recalled exemplars of specifically toned event memories.
To examine the utility of an emotion-as-information (EAI) mediator, we sought to determine whether or not sadness and anger differentially influenced beliefs regarding the general status of the environment. To accomplish this goal, we submitted participants' belief endorsement scores to a 2 (emotional state) × 2 (belief type: sad, angering) mixed ANOVA treating Type of Belief as a repeated factor. In accord with the EAI view, the predicted interaction emerged such that anger was associated with greater endorsements of the belief that the world was an angering place, and sadness with greater endorsements of the belief that the world was a depressing place, F(1, 63) = 3.93, p = .05, d = 0.35 (see more detailed analysis below). Given this finding, we moved forward into a formal test of the EAI phenomenon as a mediating mechanism.
Mediation of the Congruency Bias Through Using Emotions as Information
Given the initial analysis presented above, an EAI mediator appeared to hold promise as a mediating mechanism for the congruency bias. The question of primary interest now became whether the interaction of emotional state and global beliefs would at least partially account for an interaction of emotional state and event overtone on likelihood judgments. Thus, the relevant mediational question was not of the usual form in which one seeks to determine whether the simple effect of one variable on another is mediated through a third variable's direct effect. Rather, we sought to determine (a) if an interaction involving emotional states and event overtones on likelihood judgments occurred (as in the prior studies) and (b) if this potential interaction was mediated by a separate interaction involving emotional states and type of environmental belief on belief endorsement.
To conduct this analysis, we used a covariance structure modeling (CSM) approach. CSM is capable of incorporating latent variables when multiple measures of a particular construct are available, thereby providing more sensitive tests of hypotheses by investigating relations among constructs free of variance unique to the individual measures (e.g., measurement error). As noted earlier, however, the current mediational question was not the typical one of whether a given variable directly mediates the relation between two other constructs. Rather, the question involved the effects of specific emotions on different beliefs mediating the effects of emotions on the perceived likelihoods of different future events. One way to think about this set of relations is to conceptualize the belief endorsements and perceived likelihoods as slopes connecting the respective sad and angry items. That is, for each individual, there is a slope connecting beliefs that the world is angering versus sad (a belief slope). Similarly, there is a slope connecting perceptions that future angering versus depressing events will occur (a likelihood slope). However, given that there are three likelihood items of each type, measurement error can be estimated and removed for these constructs. Analysis of slopes as latent variables is easily handled ~s a special case of multivariate latent curve analysis (see MacCallum, Kim, Malarkey, & KiecoltGlaser, 1997; Meredith & Tisak, 1990) . In such models, the curves of interest are identified using "basis functions," and in many such applications (the present one included) the natures of the curves of interest are specified in advance through the use of fixed factor loadings.
In the present case, the latent curves are linear in form and consequently consist of two basis functions: intercepts and slopes. The specification of the complete model is depicted in Figure 3 . Four latent variables are specified: the intercept and slope for the likelihood estimates and the intercept and slope for the belief endorsements. The likelihood intercept and slope variables have fixed paths linking them to the six event estimates. Intercept paths were set to 1 for each of the six measures, representing a constant influence. The slope paths were set to -1 for perceptions of future sad events and to + 1 for perceptions of future angering events. This parameterization represents a linear increase or decrease from one type of event to the other. In addition, it represents an effects coding of the type of event, thereby marking the intercept latent variable as representing the mean judgment collapsed across event types. Following the usual assumptions of general linear model techniques, measurement errors for the event likelihoods were constrained to be equal. The situation is very similar for the belief intercept (paths of 1 for each belief) and belief slope variables (sad coded as -I and angry as + 1). Because the beliefs were modeled with a single measure of each type of belief, measurement errors were fixed to zero; all error variance is reflected in the disturbance terms for the belief intercept and slope factors, respectively. One final departure from the usual CSM framework is that latent curve analysis includes the modeling of structured means. That is, the mean values (i.e., mean factor scores) for the latent variables were not constrained to be zero. 7 In the present model, factor scores for the latent variables reflect individuals' unique intercept and slope values. Parameter estimation for each model involved in the mediation analysis was accomplished using AMOS (Arbuckle, 1997). Because there were a small number of missing data points due to the removal of outlier likelihood estimates, the model was fit to the raw data instead of the covariance matrix. 8
As outlined earlier, the central question of mediation concerns the relation between the slope latent variables, ff environmental beliefs mediate the emotion-induced bias on likelihood estimates of future events, then the direct effect of emotion on likelihood slopes should diminish greatly when paths from emotion to belief slopes and from belief slopes to likelihood slopes are included in the model. Intercept variables are included in the models in order to specify the latent curves but are of limited interest.
In examining the viability of the EAI mediator, we first examined the effect of emotional state on the intercepts and Slopes for the likelihood estimates by analyzing a submodel that included 7 Analyses involving structured means also allow for intercept estimates for manifest variables. In the present case, these intercepts were constrained to be zero, this specification being necessary to allow appropriate interpretation of the factor scores (MacCallum et al., 1997) .
8 Given the occurrence of missing data, fit indexes for the CSM model were not available. X X X X X X emotional state Figure 3 . Specification of the full latent curve model for the mediation analysis. Paths with parameter values are fixed; unlabeled paths are free. Variance paths (i.e., curved paths linking a variable to itself) labeled x are constrained to be equal. Sadl-sad3 refer to the likelihood judgements for sad events. Angl-ang3 refer to the likelihood judgments for angering events. Sad belief and angering belief refer to the respective belief endorsements regarding the status of the environment. El-el2 represent disturbance terms.
only the emotion manipulation, likelihood slope, and likelihood intercept variables (i.e., paths and variables involving the belief factors shown in the full model were removed). Model A of Figure  4 depicts the significant paths from this analysis; emotional state was coded 0 for sadness and 1 for anger. With regard to mean structures, analyses revealed that the intercept (i.e., mean of an endogenous latent variable conditional on its predictors) of the likelihood intercept factor did not differ from zero. This is to be expected given that the means of the manifest likelihood estimates are zero (because of the z transformation) and that the intercept reflects judgments collapsed across event type. The intercept of the likelihood slope factor was negative, M = -0.18, t(63) = 1.93, p < .06, indicating that sad individuals judged sad events to be more likely than angering ones. In addition, emotional state was significantly related to the likelihood slope factor. This positive parameter estimate indicated the existence of an interaction of emotional state and event type such that the experience of anger resulted in a positive slope between sad and angering events (i.e., higher estimates for angering than for sad events). Therefore, these parameters provide a replication of the distinct effects of sadness and anger on likelihood judgments of sad and angering events that were reported in the previous two studies. Quite reasonably, emotional state was not related to individuals' overall level of perceived event likelihood collapsed across sad and angering events (the likelihood intercept factor). The next step in examining mediation was to estimate the full model containing the potential mediator. As shown in Model B of Figure 4 , the predicted relations emerged. Emotional state influenced the belief slopes factor, indicating that anger was associated with a more positive slope in comparison to sadness. This finding replicates the earlier reported Emotion X Belief Type interaction. Of primary interest, however, a strong positive relation existed between the belief slope and likelihood slope factors. This relation indicates that the more one believed the world to be angering as opposed to sad, the higher frequency estimates one generated for future angering as opposed to sad events. That is, the magnitudes of the differences between individuals' likelihood estimates for sad and angering events directly corresponded to the magnitudes of the discrepancies in their beliefs about the status of their environments. Consistent with the mediation expectation, inclusion of the belief variables decreased the direct effect of emotion on likelihood slopes to nonsigniflcance. Discrete emotional states, therefore, appear to provide specific cues about the environment that, in turn, influence likelihood estimates for future events matching these states in emotional overtone.
It is also instructive to note that the intercept of the belief intercept factor was positive, M = 4.49, t(63) = 24.57, p < .001. This value simply represents the overall mean level of belief endorsement across the two types of beliefs. The intercept of the belief slope factor did not differ from zero. Finally, though not of theoretical importance, belief intercepts were positively related to likelihood intercepts. This relation implies that greater or lesser mean levels of endorsement collapsed across belief measures corresponded to greater or lesser mean frequency estimates collapsed across event types. If one held neither of these beliefs, it makes sense that all of his or her event frequency estimates would be relatively low.
Study 4
Having repeatedly demonstrated the existence of an emotionspecific influence on the assessment of event likelihoods and providing initial evidence that the process mediating this bias involves the use of discrete emotional states as informational sources, we sought in the final study to explore the nature of this bias further by asking the following question: Is the congruency bias the inevitable result of likelihood estimation in the presence of a heightened emotional state?
The issue of how individuals overcome bias holds important consequences for many types of decisions, and, accordingly, much recent research has begun to shed light on the ways in which individuals attempt to correct their judgments for biases to which they perceive they have succumbed (e.g., Martin & Achee, 1992; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kiibler, & Wanke, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995 , 1997 Wilson & Brekke, 1994) . Although the issue of bias correction involving likelihood judgments has not been previously examined, the growing body of research demonstrating correction processes in other domains suggests that the congruency bias might be subject to a similar phenomenon (cf. Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990; Martin, 1986; Ottati & Isbell, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Strack et al., 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995) .
In order to correct one's judgment for a perceived bias, an individual must both suspect the presence of some biasing agent and be motivated to exert the increased cognitive effort to compensate for it (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Strack, 1992; Wegener & Petty, 1997) . For example, Martin, Seta, and Cretia (1990) demonstrated that individuals who chronically exert high cognitive effort on judgment tasks (i.e., individuals high in the need for cognition; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982 ) evidenced a correction-based contrast effect on an impression formation task following a blatant prime. Those who chronically exert low levels of cognitive effort (i.e., individuals low in the need for cognition), however, showed an uncorrected assimilation effect following the same primes.
According to the flexible correction model (FCM; Wegener & Petty, 1997) , attempts at avoiding or removing bias are generally guided by perceivers' naive theories about the ways in which perceptions of targets are influenced. In fact, Johnson and Tversky (1983) documented that individuals tend to hold beliefs that heightened moods might bias likelihood judgments. In accord with this finding, a few studies have shown that correction for moodinduced biases is possible. For example, Berkowitz and Troccoli (1990) found that negative mood resulted in more negative appraisals of a target, provided that attention was not focused on the source of the mood. If awareness of the mood's presence was highlighted, however, individuals adjusted their judgments, resulting in more favorable appraisals of the target (for similar effects involving valence of mood, see Ottati & Isbell, 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) . The existence of an inverse bias provides strong support for the presence of correction processes.
To date, however, the issue of emotion-specific correction has not been explored. Given the identification of the congruency bias, we believed that emotion-specific correction might also exist. In the current study, therefore, we sought to determine if such a phenomenon would occur through using a situation that would be maximally conducive to the occurrence of correction processes. Specifically, we hypothesized that under conditions of high salience of the emotional state and increased accuracy motivation, individuals who exerted high levels of cognitive effort on the likelihood estimation task would engage in an emotion-specific correction for the congruency bias.
Correction or Discounting?
One might wonder, given our discussion of EAI as a mediator of emotion-specific likelihood judgments, whether classic discounting (of the type discussed in many feelings-as-information articles, e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983 ) might account for any "correction" results in the current paradigm. In the form of discounting usually discussed by feelings-as-information researchers, the informativeness of mood is thought to be undermined (e.g., by making the irrelevant source of mood salient) and people are postulated to "set mood aside" to calculate a judgment using alternative inputs to the judgment. If social perceivers are successful in setting feelings aside, and if the feelings have their primary effect through serving as "information," then discounting would result in judgments that do not differ based on the emotions experienced at the time of judgment (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; see Schwarz & Clore, 1996 , for a review). If emotions were attributed to the induction activity, then emotion-based beliefs about the state of the world would not be informative regarding the likelihoods of events.
How can one tell whether correction or discounting has occurred? One way to distinguish between these processes is to focus on the judgmental outcome itself. Although effective discounting and "accurate correction" could both result in lack of mood effects on judgments, only the correction view can account for "overcorrection" resulting in an emotion-incongruent judgmental outcome. That is, if people are simply "setting aside" emotion-based information, the alternative inputs to judgment should be the same after different emotions are set aside. This process would produce equivalent judgments after "discounting" different emotions, but it would not produce emotion-incongruent responses.
To examine the possibility of emotion-specific correction, we designed a study that was both a replication and extension of the preceding ones. The primary differences were that we (a) changed the emotion manipulations to increase the salience of the induction procedure, (b) added an instruction aimed at increasing concern for accuracy in the likelihood estimation task, and (c) included a happy emotion group in order to examine the possibility of correction effects on likelihood estimates for positive and negative emotions. We expected the congruency bias to be evident in the estimates of individuals who did not exert much effort in generating responses; as corrections of initially biased estimates require higher levels of cognitive effort (cf. Martin et al., 1990; Wegener & Petty, 1997) . We furthermore expected that individuals who did expend considerable cognitive effort on the estimation task would demonstrate an emotion-specific correction effect given high levels of salience of the source of the emotion and consequent consideration of any possible biases that might be involved. As in Martin et al.'s (1990) research, we used participants' need for cognition (NC) scores as a measure of individuals' chronic levels of cognitive effort (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996 , for a general review of NC effects).
Method Participants
One hundred and fifty-three undergraduate psychology students participated in this experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three emotion induction conditions: happiness (n = 52), sadness (n = 49), or anger (n = 52). However, as our primary predictions involved comparisons of individuals high and low in NC, we subdivided this sample for purposes of analysis. Similar to the procedure used by Martin et al. (1990) , we divided our sample using a tertiary split of NC scores (cutoff points were <56 and >66, respectively). In order to obtain two groups that differed substantially in NC, data from participants comprising the middle segment were removed from further analysis. The resulting sample consisted of 107 individuals divided among the happy (n = 30), sad (n = 33), and angry (n = 34) emotion groups.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were assigned to one of three emotion induction conditions: happy, sad, or angry. They were escorted by the experimenter to cubicles equipped with personal computers and informed that they would participate in two studies. The first involved the ability to remember and describe emotional events. The second examined their general knowledge of the occurrence of common events. The experimenter told participants that they would first be asked to describe in writing an emotional event from their past and that they were to work on this task until instructed to stop. At that time, they would turn to the computer and answer a series of questions. At that point, the experimenter distributed the materials for the emotion induction task and left the room. Upon returning, he collected the induction materials and instructed participants to begin the computer-controlled phase of the session.
The computer-based presentation of materials and collection of data were again accomplished using MediaLab (Jarvis, 1998) . In order to increase the salience of the induced emotional states, we had participants complete the emotion manipulation check prior to making likelihood estimates (cf. Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990; Berkowitz, Jaffe, Jo, & Troccoli, 1998 ; this order had been reversed in Studies 1, 2, and 3). Upon completion of the manipulation check, participants were presented with the instructions for the likelihood estimation task, followed by the task itself. Order of event presentation was again randomized. Finally, participants completed the NC scale and a set of demographic questions. At the study's completion, participants were instructed on screen to report to the experimenter in a separate room where they were debriefed.
Manipulations and Measures
Emotion manipulation. In order both to generalize our findings to different methods of emotion induction and to increase the salience of the current manipulations, we used an autobiographical recall technique adapted from Strack, Schwarz, and Gschneidinger (1985) . We instructed participants to bring to mind a time they felt very happy, sad, or angry (depending on induction condition) and to describe it in writing in as much detail as possible. Blank sheets of paper were provided for this task. To heighten the salience of the induction even further, we informed participants that the purpose of this task was to examine the nature of emotionally powerful memories. After offering these instructions, the experimenter left the room. Seven min later, he returned and asked participants to discontinue writing.
Emotion manipulation check. The manipulation check was identical to that used in Study 1, except that a Happiness subscaie consisting of happy, content, and pleasant (a = .87) was added. As noted in the procedure, we had participants complete this measure prior to the estimation task in order to increase the salience of the induced emotions (cf. Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990; Berkowitz et al., 1998) .
Event type manipulation and likelihood estimation. We again presented participants with questions of the form "Of__ people, how many will experience ," to which they responded by providing their best estimates (see Appendix A for exact stimulus set). In addition, we also included the sentence, "As accuracy is important, please be careful in entering your responses," in the instructions for the likelihood estimation task in order to highlight the need for accuracy in the making of these judgments. Data preparation followed the same procedures as in Study 1.
Cognitive processing level. Participants completed the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) as a measure of their chronic level of cognitive processing.
Results and Discussion
Emotion Manipulation Checks
The emotion manipulations resulted in the expected differences in participants' emotional states. A 3 (emotion manipulation) × 3 (emotion measure) mixed ANOVA treating Type of Emotion Measure as a repeated factor indicated reliable moderation of participants' emotional states by the induction procedures, F(4, 188) = 12.33, p < .001. We confirmed the predicted pattern of moderation using a doubly centered interaction contrast weighting cells representing matches between emotion group and emotion measure + 2, and the remaining cells -1, F(1, 188) = 45.64, p < .001, d = 2.43. 9 The residual was negligible, F(3, 188) = 1.23, ns. Thus, as shown in Table 1 , participants' feeling states were predominantly characterized by the expected emotions.
Emotion Specificity: Bias and Correction of Likelihood Assessments
Our primary goal was to show that a match between one's current emotional state and the emotional overtones of an imagined event need not always result in an increased estimate of that event's frequency of occurrence. Specifically, we expected that high NC participants would correct in an emotion-specific manner for the congruency bias due to an awareness of the induced emotional states coupled with a greater cognitive effort aimed at generating an accurate response. Low NC individuals, however, were expected to show the congruency bias found in the previous studies.
A 3 (emotional state) X 3 (event type) X 2 (NC) mixed ANOVA treating Event Type as the repeated factor revealed a systematic moderation of frequency estimates for happy, sad, and angering events by emotional state and NC, F(4, 182) = 4.16, p < .01. No main effects or lower order interactions approached significance. To examine the existence of the predicted three-way interaction, we conducted a fully centered 3 (emotional state) x 3 (event type) x 2 (NC) interaction contrast weighting the emotion congruent and emotion incongruent ceils +2 and -1, respectively, for the low NC condition (i.e., increased estimates for emotionally congruent events relative to incongruent events), and -2 and + 1 for the high NC condition (i.e., decreased estimates for emotionally congruent events relative to incongruent events). In accord with our expectations, we found strong support for the predicted pattern, F(1, 182) = 7.72, p < .01, d = 1.00. Low-NC individuals evidenced the congruency bias on likelihood estimates, but high-NC individuals engaged in a correction process and, thereby, judged events congruent with their emotional states to be relatively less likely to occur (see Figure 5 ). 1°
Although clearly supporting the predicted three-way interaction, it should be noted that a small portion of significant variation (Wegener & Petty, 1997) . Therefore, even if there is an overall consensus about the direction of a perceived bias, there can still be substantial variation across individuals with regard to magnitude, and this variation has been shown to predict differences in corrections (Wegener & Petty, 1995) . That is, participants likely perceived different biasing effects for the separate emotions across event types (e.g., happiness making happy events seem more likely, but making sad and angering events seem less likely to different degrees) and corrected, or overcorrected (cf. Wegener & Petty, 1995 , 1997 , their estimates accordingly. Such idiosyncratic variation, however, cannot easily be specified within the interaction contrast.
It is also important to note that the interaction pattern we obtained does not represent the absence of emotion-specific moderation in the high-NC condition as might result from a simple discounting of the informational value of the emotional experiences (cf. Schwarz, 1990) . Rather, an emotion-specific correction pattern emerged. Even when using the conservative strategy of considering only the 3 (emotional state) X 3 (event type) interaction within high NC individuals, an interaction contrast using the predicted correction-based pattern was found to be reliable, F(1, 92) = 5.77, p < .01. If discounting had resulted in a lack of emotion-induced effects for high-NC people, main effects or interactions involving participants' emotional states would not exist. This fact clearly provides evidence against the discounting explanation and demonstrates that high-NC individuals evidenced a correction from the 3 (emotional state) X 3 (event type) congruency bias pattern found among low-NC individuals, Finteracti ..... trast (1, 90) = 3.41, p < .10. 9 Given that interactions in any factorial design more complex than a 2 X 2 can take many forms, using planned contrasts allows for more efficient and powerful tests of specific patterns of moderation than does the omnibus test (Abelson & Prentice, 1997; Keppel, 1991) . Additionally, it is important to note that all of the interaction contrasts used in this article are fully centered (i.e., sum to zero across all dimensions of the factorial design) and, therefore, do not confound variation due to the interactions with that due to main effects (see Petty, Fabrigar, Wegener, & Priester, 1996) . 1°In interpreting this interaction, it is important to note that we are testing the opposing patterns of moderation across NC, not differences resulting from any influence of NC on the means themselves. That is, even though there was no evidence of a significant main effect for NC on the estimate values, some specific condition differences might exist between the two NC groups that resulted from differences in general knowledge or effort of processing. For example, high-NC individuals might produce estimates for certain events that are more accurate objectively and, therefore, higher or lower than those produced by low-NC individuals, regardless of emotional state. Consequently, comparisons should not be made involving the absolute values of one particular estimate across NC groups. It is the relative pattern of emotion effects across NC groups that is informative. A series of partial 2 (emotional state) X 2 (event type) X 2 (NC) mixed ANOVAs provides another window through which to see the correction pattern. As expected, evidence of the emotionspecific congruency bias and emotion-specific corrections were found in each of the three meaningful comparisons (i.e., dyadic pairings of emotional states and event types across NC participants). That is, happy and sad participants' estimates of happy and sad events, F(1, 59) = 3.57, p = .06, sad and angry participants' estimates of sad and angering events, F(1, 63) = 4.87,p = .03, and happy and angry participants' estimates of happy and angering events, F(1, 60) = 4.35, p = .04, were each moderated by participants' NC. In each case, individuals exerting relatively low cognitive effort believed that events with emotional overtones congruent with their current emotional states were more likely to occur; however, individuals exerting a greater level of effort engaged in a correction process for the perceived bias that resulted in a lessening, or in most cases a reversal, of the congruency bias.
The current correction results are also relevant to a consideration of the method used to assess the EAI mediator in Study 3. The commonly used tactic for supporting an "informational" effect of mood involves a simple demonstration of a null effect of mood on judgment when the source of the mood has been made salient (see Schwarz & Clore, 1996) . In part, this is exactly what we did in the current study. The source of the emotion should have been abundantly clear because of both the type of manipulation used and the timing of the manipulation check. Consistent with our expectations, this setting brought about corrections. Such theorybased corrections could remove, or reverse, a bias regardless of its initial source (i.e., whether it was memory based or EAI derived). Therefore, making the source of feelings salient appears less than useful for identifying the source of the initial bias. Consequently, for Study 3, we chose to measure directly the types of beliefs associated with an EAI view of the initial bias.
As noted earlier, the FCM posits that individuals correct their judgments according to their naive theories of the effect of biasing agents (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995 , 1997 . That is, the FCM suggests that the high-NC individuals in the present study adjusted their judgments according to perceptions of the differential effects of emotional states on likelihood estimates for the various events (e.g., feeling sad makes people believe sad events are more likely and happy events are less likely). Direct measures of these theories of bias were not available for the participants of Study 4, but we have documented their existence within the participant population.
In a separate study, in addition to assessing levels of NC, we asked 31 individuals from the same undergraduate pool to report how feeling happy, sad, and angry would influence their likelihood estimates of happy, sad, and angering events. Participants did so using a 9-point bipolar scale ranging from -4 (i.e., would make events seem less likely) to 4 (i.e., would make events seem more likely), with 0 indicating no perceived biasing effect. A series of t tests revealed that participants held theories that each of the emotions would bias estimates for each of the event types. For each of the nine conditions (3 emotions × 3 event types), mean values of the estimated biases reliably differed from zero (all one sample ts > 2.00, ps < .05). In accord with the FCM, the correlation between the mean expected bias ratings and the mean likelihood estimates of the high-NC participants across the nine estimation conditions was sizable (r = -.54), indicating that the pattern of corrections was highly related to the theories of bias held by the undergraduate population. This sizeable relation is noteworthy, especially given that the participants were reporting beliefs outside the context of the judgment task (i.e., without experiencing the emotions that would have been present when asked to assess the potential effect of the particular emotion on each type of judgment). Finally, it is also important to note that high-and low-NC individuals reported the same naive theories in this domain. A 9 (specific theory) × 2 (NC) mixed ANOVA with Theory treated as the repeated factor indicated no hint of theory differences between high-and low-NC individuals, F(8, 232) = 0.61, p = .77.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the findings presented here extend the understanding of emotion-induced biases on likelihood estimation and risk assessment in three novel and consequential ways. First, the affective bias identified by Johnson and Tversky over 15 years ago has been shown to function in an emotion-specific manner. The valence-based findings reported in the original Johnson and Tversky (1983) experiments may represent a function of the stimuli used. The negative events used in their work were drawn from a variety of categories (e.g., tornadoes, stomach cancer, accidental falls, divorce, war) that were closely linked to experiences of death and sadness rather than anger or other negative emotions. In fact, many of the targets (i.e., tornadoes, floods, etc.) were closely linked to the kind of materials we used in the current studies to induce sadness. Therefore, although the events used in the Johnson and Tversky studies were quite diverse semantically, they may have been homogeneous with respect to the emotions represented. Thus, the Johnson and Tversky findings can be viewed as consistent with the emotion-specific effects obtained in the current studies. Future work aimed at more directly addressing both the influence of specific emotions on and the affective qualities of the Johnson and Tversky events would be able to examine this issue more directly. The current work, however, indicates that a consideration of valence alone is inadequate to explain emotion-based likelihood biases, despite its dominance as a focus in research of this type. It is clear that distinct emotions of the same valence increase likelihood estimates of events that possess overtones congruent with the perceiver's specific emotional state.
The current studies also present evidence regarding the cognitive processes that underlie the congruency bias. The current data were more consistent with the view that emotional states influence perceptions of likelihood by acting as a source of information regarding the surrounding environment as opposed to differentially facilitating the recall of specific episodic memories. That is, when confronted with the need to assess an event's likelihood of occurrence, individuals appear to use the salient cues provided by their emotions to generate a response (cf. Schwarz & Clore, 1983 . For example, anger signifies the possibility of confrontation, frustration, or hostility in the environment (cf. Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, 1984) . Consequently, when people are angry, they may use the cues provided by this emotion and thereby produce inflated estimates of any future events that would engender such phenomenological experiences. It is important to note, however, that using emotions as informative cues does not always represent a flawed strategy. Emotions serve to motivate and guide individuals with respect to salient objects in their environs (cf. Darwin, 1872; Frijda, 1986; Salovey et al., in press) and, consequently, may increase adaptive responding to specific environmental challenges quickly through heuristic or reflexive processes. However, when the informational value of emotions is misapplied to stimuli not relevant to the current situation, nonoptimal (i.e., biased) judgments may result.
Finally, the current work shows for the first time that emotionspecific corrections can occur by demonstrating that the congruency bias need not always result in the presence of heightened emotions. Consistent with the growing correction literature (see Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994 , for reviews), individuals in the final study, given certain environmental and motivational contingencies, were capable of correcting for emotion-related biases that they perceived to be influencing their likelihood judgments. Our use of a blatant emotion induction and placement of an emotion check immediately prior to the judgment task most likely allowed individuals to identify the cause and existence of their elevated emotional states at the time of likelihood assessment and to act accordingly if they chose to exert the requisite level of cognitive effort (Wegener & Petty, 1997; cf. Berkowitz et al., 1998) .
Mediation: Further Thoughts and Conundrums
The current findings implicating the use of emotions as informative cues as a mediating process for the congruency bias supports a view that contrasts somewhat with certain models of likelihood estimation. In a recent and comprehensive review, Dougherty, Gettys, and Ogden (1999) noted that the recall of past exemplars appears to be one central determinant of likelihood judgments, and, consequently, they proposed a new memory-based model to explain past findings regarding biases in likelihood assessment. Given the work of Niedenthal and colleagues demonstrating the facilitative effect of discrete emotional states on the recall of semantic information possessing the same emotional overtone Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994) , the reported absence of a similar effect for emotionally toned episodic traces in the current studies might seem perplexing. Memory and neuroscience research from the past two decades, however, has continued to accumulate evidence that semantic and episodic memory constitute two distinct systems (DeRenzi, Liotti, & Nichelli, 1987; Tulving, 1993; Tulving, Schacter, McLachlan, & Moscovitch, 1988) . To date, a thorough analysis of the effects of discrete emotions on the recall of episodic memories has not been attempted. Given the findings presented here, it may be the case that specific emotional states do not facilitate recall of like-toned event memories, though much further work needs to be devoted to this issue before any definitive claims can be made. What is certain is that emotion plays a role in the encoding of episodic memories; the amygdala has been found to regulate the attention and processing assigned to highly arousing stimuli (Bechara et al., 1995; McGaugh, 1995) . What remains unclear, however, is the interplay of simple arousal and higher order characteristics of various discrete emotions on recall.
From an adaptation standpoint, the failure to identify an episodic accessibility-based mediating mechanism makes some sense. Such a mechanism might not be optimal. It is abundantly clear that individuals do not possess episodic memories depicting every type of risk that they might confront. For example, a young hunter in some part of the world may not have a memory of a bear charging at him. If he is on a hunt and feels fear as darkness approaches, he may use this emotion as an informational resource if he were to consider the possibility of a bear attack. His elevated vigilance should only increase his odds of survival against any possible danger. In this way, emotion serves as a source of information that can guide decisions in an adaptive manner when used in the appropriate context. Aversive consequences can, of course, also result from inappropriate use of this process, but, as is the case with most heuristics, the tactic must function adaptively more often than not if it is retained.
If it were the case that individuals had to rely solely on the retrieval of episodic memories to determine likelihoods, the generalizability of this effect to important life domains would be greatly reduced and, therefore, make use of this heuristic quite inefficient. Indeed, Dougherty et al. (1999) noted that there is substantial reason to believe that not all biases of likelihood judgments stem from differences in episodic recall; other, higher order cognitive and metacognitive processes not involving memory are also believed to play a role. Johnson and Tversky (1983) echoed a similar theme. Given that semantic associations between the induction materials and judged events in their experiments did not influence the reported bias, it seems unlikely that estimates resulted from a memory-based effect. These claims appear especially apropos to the current findings but should not be taken to imply definitively that memory did not influence the production of likelihood judgments in any way in the current experiments. Future work is needed to explicate more clearly the role different memory systems might play in the congruency bias.
Conclusions and Implications
Does being sad equally increase likelihood estimates for sad and angering events? Prior to the findings presented here, the most likely answer to this question would have been yes. By offering three new findings in this area, the present research reveals that the answer to this question is now decidedly more complex. We have shown that in conditions where the presence of a heightened emotion is not salient, an emotion-specific congruency bias exists such that emotions of the same valence differentially inflate likelihood estimates for events matching these states in emotional overtone. Unlike what had previously been believed, it is now clear that it is not only valence that matters when making such estimates. Moreover, a second insight offered here is that this biasing influence of emotions is not unavoidable. If individuals are aware of their heightened emotions and wish to be accurate, events with emotional overtones congruent with individuals' current emotional states can be perceived as less likely to occur, provided that these individuals exert a relatively high level of cognitive effort to arrive at their judgments. That is, we have demonstrated that individuals can correct for perceived biases in an emotion-specific manner, although this correction may not always be accurate (i.e., overcorrection can occur).
Taken together, these findings hold several implications for the many cognitive and behavioral processes that incorporate perceptions of event likelihoods and risk as integral variables. For example, expectancy-value models of attitude structure dictate that attitudes are a function of both the desirability of attributes that an object possesses and the likelihoods that it possesses, or will result in, specific attributes or outcomes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) . Consequently, any bias that influences perceptions of likelihood should also influence attitude change. For instance, whether one's attitude toward immigration management is swayed by the vitriol of a politician railing against the loss of American jobs to illegal aliens might depend both on the level of anger one feels, either in response to the message or from some other source, and on whether or not one realizes that this emotion might be a source of bias. If anger is produced by such a speech, the congruency bias, in this case, should increase one's estimate of the number of jobs filled by illegal immigrants and, therefore, make one's attitude toward policies such as increased boarder patrols more favorable (cf. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Petty & Wegener, 1991; Weiss & Fine, 1956 ). However, if individuals realize that emotion might be influencing objectivity, are motivated to arrive at an accurate response, and exert the necessary cognitive effort, our findings suggest that they might correct their initial estimates, resulting in an opposing pattern of persuasion to the politician's chagrin.
Similar consequences, no doubt, exist in the health domain. Much research has shown that perceived risk plays an important role in how and when individuals adopt adaptive behaviors (e.g., using health screenings, increasing condom use; see Becker & Rosenstock, 1987; Fisher & Fisher, 1992) . Given that an emotionspecific bias affecting perceived risk has been identified, more precise design and targeting of persuasive communications meant to increase adaptive behaviors is possible than would have been available from a solely valence-centered strategy. For example, an anger-oriented message might result in heavy smokers increasing their beliefs that their addictions are due to a purposeful nicotine management program by cigarette manufacturers. This belief, in turn, should result in their attitudes toward these corporations and their products becoming more negative and, thereby, increase their motivations to stop smoking.
In sum, identification of an emotion-specific bias in the perception of event likelihoods not only promises to provide new avenues for application in the persuasion domain but also adds to the relatively nascent, but increasing, store of knowledge that offers evidence of the complex and divergent ways in which distinct emotions influence cognition and behavior (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Niedenthal et al., 1997) . Though an important part of understanding emotion-related effects, a consideration of valence alone appears to represent an inadequate strategy for discovering and modeling the full effect of emotion on cognition. It appears quite probable that just as specific emotions result in response to distinct environmental elicitors, they may correspondingly influence thought and behavior in differing manners in an attempt to engender the appropriate situation-specific responses. The appropriateness of these responses, however, may rest on the relevance of the emotion to the judgment at hand. What might be a clearly adaptive strategy in some circumstances can quickly become a biasing one when applied indiscriminately across a wide variety of situations and judgments.
